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Sex doesn’t matter? The problematic status of 
sex, misogyny, and hate
Jennifer Anne Sloan Rainbow
Abstract
In this paper, I seek to highlight and re-emphasise the ongoing problem of the 
disconnection between the terms ‘hate’ and linguistic violence against women. 
Despite the prevalence of violent, misogynistic and sexist actions against women, 
it was only in 2016 that police forces saw "t to categorise these actions as ‘hate’, 
and only then in one police force (Nottinghamshire Police) with one forward 
thinking (female) Chief Constable working in partnership with Nottingham 
Women’s Centre. As such, I seek here to look in more depth at the disconnection 
between hate and crimes according to sex – particularly with regard to hate 
speech, and to unpick some of the reasons behind this, and the problems with 
failing to acknowledge such matters within law and social policy.
keywords: sex; hate speech; sexism; hate; misogyny; discrimination
Introduction
During the 4nal stages of the run-up to the 2016 US Presidential election, 
candidate Donald Trump was revealed to have made sexist comments 
and inappropriate remarks and behaviours. >e British newspaper #e 
Telegraph created its own ‘sexism tracker’, detailing remarks going back to 
the 1990s (Cohen 2016). It includes details of Trump calling women names 
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including ‘Dog’, ‘Miss Piggy’, ‘Disgusting Animal’, and also details a video 
recording of Mr Trump referring to ‘grabbing (women) by the pussy’, seem-
ingly celebrating his ability to do so, as a celebrity 4gure. While many of us 
watching naïvely put this down to the distasteful individual predilections 
of the individual in question, we were sadly disappointed when a variety 
of other public 4gures defended Mr Trump’s stance. Nigel Farage, former 
leader of the UK Independence Party, referred to Mr Trump’s behaviour as 
‘alpha male boasting’ and something ‘if we are being honest that men do’ 
(BBC 2016); and former Happy Days and Diagnosis Murder star Scott Baio 
stated: ‘Ladies, this is what guys talk about when you’re not around’ and ‘If 
you’re oJended by it, grow up okay?’ (Blair 2016). Even when thousands of 
women (and men) took to the streets to protest in the women’s marches 
with so called ‘pussy hats’ (Pussy Hat Project 2017) in response to Trump’s 
remarks about grabbing women, this didn’t stop more public 4gures from 
making inappropriate remarks; Piers Morgan’s Twitter backlash at the 
marchers (‘I’m planning a men’s march to protest at the creeping global 
emasculation of my gender by rabid feminists. Who’s with me?’ (Morgan 
2017)) stimulated much distaste, debate, and even 4lm star Ewan McGregor 
refusing to share time on a TV programme with him (BBC 2017). >is is all 
situated within Western democracies, where women’s equality and physi-
cal autonomy is seemingly protected in law and policy.
I began writing this article post-Brexit (which in itself instigated high rates 
of hate crime1 within the UK – see Cuerden and Rogers 2017; Prentoulis 
et al. 2017) and in the 4nal days of the run-up to the US Presidential elec-
tion. In the weeks following these events, the presence of hate and fear was 
palpable, as was the obvious presence of misogyny and sexism (and the 
apparent lack of social policy provision to address the issues). Indeed, the 
two (misogyny and sexism) go practically hand in hand – as they do in the 
daily lived experiences of women across the globe. I say ‘women’ – while 
men do experience sexism and harassment, it is rarely on the same scale, 
rarely so intertwined with violence, and rarely so debilitating that it under-
mines their ability to continue to live lives that are privileged by having a 
penis – unless, that is, they live with another intersecting characteristic 
which is the subject of hate. 
‘Hate crime’ in England and Wales recognises these intersecting charac-
teristics through the process of the police ‘monitoring’ 4ve characteristics: 
disability, race, religion, sexual orientation and gender identity (i.e. trans-
gendered lives). >ese 4ve characteristics are prioritised across England’s 
forty-three police forces for recording as subjects of hate, over and above 
other characteristics. >at said, police forces are increasingly recognising 
other characteristics as being worthy of the label ‘hate crime’ – often in the 
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wake of a terrible tragedy which can only be attributed to hate and preju-
dices, such as the death of Sophie Lancaster2 leading to the recognition of 
‘goths’ as being a further group at risk of being potential victims of hate. 
Misogyny and sexism are two diJerent issues, but both are demonstra-
tions of diJerential, negative treatment undertaken, based on the assump-
tion of inequity between men and women. Indeed, in the wake of Australian 
politician Julia Gillard’s speech including the term ‘misogyny’ in regard 
to Australian politician Tony Abbott in 2012, one Australian dictionary 
amended its de4nition of misogyny ‘to re\ect the fact that it is now used 
to mean “entrenched prejudice against women”, not just hatred of them’ 
(#e Guardian 2012). Misogyny has traditionally been concerned with 
a hatred towards women, with sexism more often comprising prejudice. 
Indeed, sexism has been de4ned in numerous ways, raising issues regard-
ing the term’s complexity. Vetterling-Braggin de4nes sexism as ‘the practices 
whereby someone foregrounds gender when it is not the most salient feature’ 
(1981), whereas Mills problematises this as being too simplistic. Rather, she 
states the need to look beyond the individual basis for sexism, instead
‘foregrounding the view that sexism, just like racism and other discriminatory 
forms of language, stems from larger societal forces, wider institutional 
inequalities of power and ultimately, therefore, con\ict over who has rights 
to certain positions and resources […] sexism is an index of ongoing con\ict 
between men and women’ (Mills 2008:1–2).
In this paper, I seek to re-emphasise the ongoing problem of the disconnec-
tion between the terms ‘hate’ and violence against women (particularly in 
the form of hate speech), misogyny, and sexism, an issue which has been 
repeatedly pointed out over the years (Mason-Bish 2016; Perry 2001), yet 
generally continues to go unnoticed and/or unaddressed. Despite the preva-
lence of violent, misogynistic and sexist actions against women,3 it was only 
in 2016 that police forces saw 4t to recognise these actions as ‘hate’, and only 
then in one police force (Nottinghamshire Police) with one forward thinking 
(female) Chief Constable working in partnership with Nottingham Women’s 
Centre following the Nottingham Citizens’ 2014 ‘No Place for Hate’ report 
(Nottingham Citizens 2014; Nottingham Women’s Centre 2016). As such, 
I seek here to re-emphasise the hateful nature of oJences against women 
simply because they are women; to re-examine arguments as to why this is 
not a political priority; to highlight how the failure to recognise such actions 
as hate crime is based on a numbers game as well as to highlight the over-
whelming scale of the problem in modern British society (and beyond).
>e relationship between the sub-disciplines of hate crime and physi-
cal violence against women is one of tension and debate. Some argue that 
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physical violence against women and rape are manifestations of hate (Gill 
and Mason-Bish 2013; Maher, McCulloch and Mason 2015). Others argue 
that extending the de4nition of hate crime to include violence against 
women risks marginalising issues of sexuality (Tomsen and Mason 2001) 
as well as marginalising the other forms of hate due to the overrepresenta-
tion of women if included as a characteristic (McPhail 2003). >is situation 
confuses motivations and meanings of ‘hate’ (McPhail 2003), highlighting 
the con\ict between freedom of expression and censorship (see Edström 
2016; Jacoby 2002; Phillips 2002) as well as raising issues of public policy 
(Gelber, 2000). As such, the matter of physical violence against women as 
a manifestation of hate is a well-trodden path; here, rather, I am concerned 
with linguistic ‘violence’ against women in the form of hate speech and acts 
of misogyny and sexism. 
In this paper, I argue that the discipline of hate crime needs to take a 
more inclusive approach to other forms of harm targeted at particular dis-
tinct groups, and that sex is one of the most obvious places to start. I argue 
that we need to look not only at violence against women as a form of hate 
crime – as others have argued already (see Chakraborti and Garland 2009; 
Choundas 1995; Iganski and Levin 2015; McPhail 2003; Weisburd and 
Levin 1994) – but also include sexism and sexual harassment within this 
dimension as forms of hate speech. To do so would make great advances 
in seeing such oJences as worthy of critical attention by all – rather than 
sidelining it to the realm of feminists – and acknowledging that this is one 
of the most serious issues of discriminatory harm that we see in modern 
society, having implications for half the population and spanning across 
age, class, sexuality, race and religion.
Sex as a protected characteristic
Within English4 legislation, social policy and criminal justice, the notions 
of ‘sex’, ‘hate crime’ and how they are de4ned and intertwine, is an interest-
ing conundrum. 
Sex
>e Equality Act 2010 – a piece of legislation intended to
‘have regard to the desirability of reducing socio-economic inequalities; to reform 
and harmonise equality law and restate the greater part of the enactments relating 
to discrimination and harassment related to certain personal characteristics; 
[…] to prohibit victimisation in certain circumstances; to require the exercise of 
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certain functions to be with regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and 
other prohibited conduct […]’ (Equality Act 2010: Introduction)
– includes sex as one of nine ‘protected characteristics’5 which found the 
basis for discriminating conduct. ‘Sex’ is de4ned here as follows: ‘(a) a ref-
erence to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a ref-
erence to a man or to a woman; (b) a reference to persons who share a 
protected characteristic is a reference to persons of the same sex.’ (Equality 
Act 2010 s11). Here, there is clearly a provision to protect against sexual 
discrimination, i.e. treating someone diJerently as a result of their sex, 
albeit while conforming to the medicalised binary de4nition which itself 
is problematic. >e Equality Act 2010 places considerable responsibili-
ties on organisations and groups to protect against such discrimination 
and uphold equality in day-to-day life, and civil cases in the courts to 4nd 
justice in the event of an infringement have been numerous. As such, there 
is a precedent for the recognition of sex as an important ‘othering’ char-
acteristic within civil dimensions of social policy. Criminal social policy in 
the form of hate crime – which might be the obvious place to start when it 
comes to discrimination against personal characteristics – is another story. 
‘Hate crime’
>e accepted de4nition of hate crime is:
‘any criminal oJence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to 
be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal 
characteristic.’ >is common de4nition was agreed in 2007 by the police, Crown 
Prosecution Service, Prison Service (now the National OJender Management 
Service) and other agencies that make up the criminal justice system. […] Hate 
crimes are a subset of noti4able crimes that are recorded by the police […] and 
make up around 2 per cent of all crimes. (Corcoran and Smith 2016:2)
Hate crime is relatively new as a sub-discipline of criminological debate, 
and itself is subject to a number of diJerent de4nitions, this being one of 
the key problems with hate crime in practice. In fact, the notion of hate 
crime in practice is an interesting one; while there are characteristics 
that are protected and recognised as being the potential subject of hate, 
in reality this will only impact upon processes of sentencing, rather than 
being actual distinguishing oJences in themselves. In this respect, ‘hate 
crime’ as a term is a misnomer; it is more accurate to think in terms of ‘hate 
sentencing’ or ‘hate recording’, although these sound much less appealing. 
>e College of Policing de4nes ‘hate crime’ as ‘any criminal oJence 
which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a 
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hostility or prejudice’ (2014:4) based on one of 4ve ‘monitored’ character-
istics: race, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity (i.e. transgender) 
or disability. >ere are easily seen parallels with the spirit of the Equality 
Act 2010 here, but with noticeable absences in categories. As such, crimes 
motivated by one of these 4ve characteristics are recorded by the police as 
being motivated by hate, with such records allowing a longitudinal record 
of victimisation according to such characteristics. Crimes falling under 
other characteristics are treated diJerently, as the College of Policing goes 
on to discuss:
>ere are, however, many other groups in society who have been targeted with 
hostility and crime. During consultation to agree the monitored strands, a further 
21 diJerent groups were identi4ed for consideration. It is essential that the focus 
on the monitored strands is not used to deny the existence of other hate crimes. 
Additional strands that were considered, but not included, range from sexual 
abuse to football violence. 
 Agencies and partnerships are free to extend their own policy response to 
include the hostilities that they believe are prevalent in their area or that are 
causing the greatest concern to the community. Telling a victim that a crime is 
not a hate crime could be deeply oJensive to them. >is is particularly the case 
when the circumstances 4t the 4rst part of the common de4nition: ‘Any crime 
or incident where the perpetrator’s hostility or prejudice against an identi4able 
group of people is a factor in determining who is victimised’. (College of Policing 
2014:7)
On the face of it, this appears to demonstrate a commitment to recognising 
all potential personal characteristics as having the potential to be the basis 
of hate. Yet, in reality, we know that this is unsustainable. Pressures placed 
upon the Police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) when charging 
mean that de4nitions and perceptions of seriousness within social policy 
mean everything, and the fact that sex does not fall into one of these named 
‘monitored’ hate crimes gives it a diJerent dimension: it is not a privileged 
category within law or policy. Tatchell describes the issue as ‘some people 
are more equal than others’ (2002), and Nielsen argues that ‘members of 
traditionally disadvantaged groups6 face a strikingly diJerent reality on the 
street than do members of privileged groups’ (in this instance, discussing 
racist and sexist hate speech) (2002:265). Discrimination is apparent: sex is 
treated diJerently. At least in the realm of hate crime, sex, it would seem, 
doesn’t matter enough.
>is is not exclusive to England and Wales (although discussions about 
the matter in this paper are limited to this jurisdiction). Indeed, Granström 
(2007) has criticised the lack of legislation against hatred against women 
in Sweden; Weston-Scheuber (2012) makes a similar argument regarding 
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Australia; Brown (2004) highlights the issue in New Zealand; and Nielsen 
discusses the issue in the American context, where freedom of speech is 
held in particularly high regard (2002). As such, the issue and its lack of 
recognition is, therefore, international in scale. 
What is also lacking is a joined-up, UK-wide police force approach to 
the treatment of other personal characteristics. >at said, the recording 
of an oJence as a hate crime does not necessarily guarantee any further 
acknowledgement by the criminal justice system as, in terms of legal pro-
visions, the treatment of hate crime oJenders is limited. >e only real 
criminal justice elements available are in the form of harsher sentencing 
provisions in the event that an incident falls into certain categories within 
Acts of Parliament, namely the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Sections 145 and 
146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allow for an increased sentence to be 
given for racial or religious aggravation (s145) or for aggravation related to 
disability or sexual orientation (s146), as long as this was an aggravating 
factor, and the use of these sections is stated in open court. >e Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of OJenders Act 2012 s65 extends this latter 
provision to include transgender identity. 
Despite the fact that women form a substantial category of victim, and 
dominate certain crime types such as intimate and sexual violence to such 
a degree that sex is a clear de4ning characteristic for risk, there is a great 
reluctance to see sex as a characteristic worthy of being singled out in the 
same way as race, religion, sexuality, disability and transgendered identity. 
Indeed, ‘society’s continued belief in rape myths and separation of the 
public and private spheres continue to cause violence against women to be 
seen in a diJerent, and often less serious, light’ (McPhail 2003:266). >is 
sends a key message to victims through social policy – as Perry notes:
By leaving gender out of the hate crime equation, legislators are recreating the 
myth that gendered violence is an individual and privatised form of violence, 
unequal to the public and political harms suJered by racial or religious 
minorities, for example. (2001:210)
Hate crime academics have argued for hate crime to include violence 
against women due to the similarities that run parallel to monitored hate 
crime characteristics – ‘if domestic violence is a form of gendered crime 
that impacts worst upon women, and if women are viewed as a disadvan-
taged group, then there may be some parallels with other forms of hate 
crime’ (Chakraborti and Garland 2009:85). Yet this also runs the risk of 
trying to shoehorn women’s experiences into a broader debate of harm, 
which could run the risk of losing much of the distinctive attention and 
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resources directed solely towards female victims. McPhail makes the point 
that,
‘Largely due to the work of liberal feminists, violence against women has received 
increased attention, funding, and legal reform. However, the liberal feminist 
perspective focuses on gaining equality with men in the public sphere, often 
without explicating the root causes of the inequalities.’ (2003:267)
It is arguable that situating sex within hate crime would mean a loss in 
distinctive attention to women as a victim group. >at said, it might actu-
ally help in terms of highlighting the problematic state of masculinity that 
leads to men (who make up the majority of violent oJenders) attacking 
other men and women merely due to diJerences in characteristics. But, 
yet again, hate speech directed at women goes unrecognised within such 
debates.
As such, it is arguable that there is a pyramid of priorities of hate within 
criminal policy; those falling within the pre-decided 4ve categories which 
have been included within legislation are given the greatest impact through 
sentencing, while other forms of crime which are based upon other de4n-
ing characteristic of identity may be recorded as hate by police forces, with 
no real implications for the oJender. >erefore, there is clear discrimina-
tion against certain characteristics compared with others. Finally, there are 
those incidents where de4ning characteristics are not really seen to matter 
as much, and not seen to fall into the realms of hate. In essence, while sex 
is given some protection in civil law, it has not been seen by legislators to 
qualify for the label of ‘hate’. 
The importance of the problems of de#nitions
Some readers may criticise me at this point based on semantics; true, 
misogyny is not a recognised monitored hate crime, but it can be rec-
ognised by police forces as an addition. >is is undoubtedly the case – 
Nottinghamshire Police Force being the leaders in pushing the recording of 
misogyny as hate crime forward. >at said, however, it is important to rec-
ognise that de4nitions and where they lie within social policy and policing 
and crime priorities do matter. >e fact that misogyny and sexism (and all 
crimes based on sex) are not readily recognised as a monitored hate crime 
has serious implications further down the line in terms of legislation and 
social policy. >e key to monitored hate crimes is that they are recorded 
and monitored (as the name implies). >e generation of such statistics 
is not merely for academic professing or news soundbites – government 
policy is, more often than not, based on such statistical pronouncements. 
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It is well known that government ministers do not have time to sift through 
qualitative research 4ndings – they need, and use, statistics, no matter how 
problematic those statistics may be. Without such statistics, it is unlikely 
that an issue will be made a priority with regard to policy formation, or 
funding. As such, to leave sex-based oJences out of monitored hate crimes 
means that these are missing from the picture of hate crime more generally, 
and will not be seen in quite the same way. 
Again, this might be met with the argument that violence against women 
is recorded in statistics, just in diJerent ways. I would argue that there are 
three key problems with this approach. One, the separating out of violence 
(of any form) against women away from hate crime does, in fact, make 
it more likely to be sidelined as another issue – not hate, but something 
‘just about women’. Indeed, Mills discusses this apparent disconnection 
between sexism and hate speech: ‘Sexism seems, even in its most violent 
misogynistic manifestations, to be fundamentally diJerent to hate speech 
[…] It could be argued that this is because of the very diJerent relation-
ship between women and men within society and the other groups which 
are subject to discrimination’ (Mills 2008:39). She goes on to note that in 
most cases of hate crime, the aim is to diJerentiate and separate groups 
from wider society, whereas ‘by contrast, society as a whole is based on 
the notion of the female-male heterosexual couple who live together in an 
intimate relationship’ (2008:39). 
While this contradiction between women and other hate crime victim 
groups is clear to see, to say that sexism is diJerent to a hate crime because 
the hate/harm is not directed against all women has the same eJect of 
making these oJences somehow diJerent, despite in every other way 
aligning with hate crimes against other groups. Such an argument fails to 
acknowledge the intersecting factors that result in hate crimes occurring 
in everyday life: an oJender will rarely attack just any individual, and there 
is often some form of rational choice or opportunity element involved (see 
Clarke and Felson 1993; Clarke and Cornish 1985). To leave women out of 
hate crime discussions due to their somehow being a ‘diJerent’ category is 
a fundamental error. Hate aJects everyone in diJerent ways, but victims 
of hate tend to experience such events in very similar ways regardless of 
characteristic – ‘hate crimes hurt more’ as Iganski states (2001). He notes 
that hate crimes generally have to attempt to demonstrate two types of 
injury to be seen as a distinct class of crime: ‘psychic injury’ and emotional 
harm; and the sending out of a message of ‘terror’ (Iganski 2001:635). 
>ose working in the areas of violence against women know all too well 
the emotional and mental impacts that harassment, stalking, sex-based 
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violence and aggression can have (Zinzow et al. 2012); and the term ‘ter-
rorism’ often goes hand in hand with such harms (Johnson 2011). 
Indeed, Iganksi notes that ‘little is known about the eJects of hate crimes 
beyond the impact on the initial victims’ (2001:636) – in actuality, we do 
know that women police their behaviours in response to the perceived 
and experienced threats against their sex in a multitude of manners (to 
be discussed later). With particular regard to hate speech against women, 
Edström notes that threats and hate speech directed against Nordic jour-
nalists have had two key problematic outcomes. First, ‘the purpose of the 
threats is to silence […] the harassment might also scare other women and 
keep them from entering into journalism’ (2016:102). >is links neatly to 
Iganski’s notion of waves of harm (2001) spreading outward from a hate 
crime incident to impact upon wider and wider groups. Secondly, ‘one 
never knows when words will turn into actions […] hateful speech can 
serve as fuel for an action where you least expect it’ (2016:102). Again, this 
links well with Iganski’s work – particularly the notion of hate as terror 
with all its symbolic and potential for physical violence (2001:635). 
>e second problem is that the very thing being measured through 
recording violence against women and (where it is even recorded) instances 
of sexism and misogyny, comes down to the diJerential and discrimina-
tory treatment of women over men. >at is what sexism and misogyny 
are. As such, sidelining sex-based crimes as ‘other’ merely repeats the very 
problem on a larger scale – it posits it as diJerent and not worthy of the 
same attention. While some may argue that this is bene4cial as resources 
can be focused on women as opposed to other categories of victim, it is 
arguable that this continued separation merely replicates the problem of 
sexism and misogyny. Indeed, as soon as you ‘other’ a category of people, 
discrimination and diJerential treatment follow – where this can bene4t 
one group, the balance usually tilts against another. With regard to social 
policy and equality, this is a counterintuitive approach. Walters (2014) 
makes this point with respect to rape as a hate crime:
… exclusion [from hate crime de4nitions] may actually perpetuate the myths 
surrounding why men choose to rape women. In other words, the state’s refusal 
to acknowledge gendered violence as gendered ‘hostility’ may actually send an 
unintended counter message that gendered crimes are not gendered at all. >is, 
in turn, feeds directly into misogynistic beliefs about women being partly to 
blame for their own victimisation.
>e third problem lies in the common assumption that hate crime and 
victimisation is synonymous with physical harm and victimisation. It is all 
very well for those wanting to maintain separation between hate crime and 
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violence against women services, but what about those instances where 
women are targeted verbally? In these cases, they do not fall within the 
scope of such service providers focusing upon violence, so to ignore them in 
other instances where they could be given police (or other) attention seems 
to imply that they are not seen to be as serious as physical victimisation. 
Yet, when we look at women’s experiences of misogyny and violence, it is 
important to remember again that the lived experience and interpretation 
of incidents varies substantially from person to person. Kelly’s (1987) con-
tinuum of sexual violence positions experiences according to prevalence 
rather than seriousness. Kelly critiques presumptions regarding victim 
experiences of seriousness, noting that seriousness and victimisation expe-
riences are subjectively processed and cannot be so easily categorised. It is 
important to recognise that women will experience gendered harms dif-
ferently to other women – and this is the crux of the problem. Women do 
not always see harms against them as serious when they are so prevalent in 
everyday life. >is became evident upon creation of the Everyday Sexism 
Project by Laura Bates (see http://everydaysexism.com), which sought to 
4nd a central place for women (and men) to report sexism incidents expe-
rienced. While thousands report their experiences on social media, it is 
rare for these to transfer to police reports or crime statistics, being seen as 
an everyday part of life as a woman. 
Similarly, when looking at the statistics on those hate crime categories 
that are reported and recorded by the police, physical victimisation does 
not form the majority of overall reports (Corcoran and Smith 2016:15). 
Indeed, Nielsen has found that incidents of hate speech are ‘often quite 
subtle, leaving all but intended victims unaware that it occurs […] such 
interactions occur with regularity and leave targets harmed in signi4cant 
ways’ (2002:265). As such, there is a need to take into account those expe-
riences of hate that are not as clearly visible as the physical with greater 
sensitivity than is often experienced.
Sex and hate
I had hoped that I would be able to demonstrate the importance of gender 
as an intersecting characteristic in existing hate crime data by breaking 
down the existing hate crime statistics for the 4ve monitored character-
istics according to sex. Unfortunately, these data are not readily available 
with regard to police recorded crime, the information is not there (at least 
not within the public sphere). Such a lack of information is interesting, and 
communicative, in itself. When looking at the Crime Survey for England 
and Wales (CSEW), although the 4gures are there, the actual total number 
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of hate crimes only accounts for a small proportion of the entire population 
of England and Wales (0.4%; CSEW 2016b:Appendix Table 4.03). What 
data there are indicate that of all the hate crimes reported in the CSEW in 
2015, 0.4% of men had experienced hate crime, and 0.3% of women (CSEW 
2016b:Appendix Table 4.05). Yet this is subject to the fact that this only 
records for the 4ve monitored strands of hate crime previously de4ned. 
When looking at violence statistics, we see that 2.2% of men are victims of 
all violence as opposed to 1.4% of women (CSEW 2016a:Appendix Table 
1.01). If, however, we look at the number of women reporting intimate vio-
lence (which is only one of the potential manifestations of hate), against 
the total numbers of hate crime in the CSEW, we see a slightly diJerent 
picture. Whereas only 0.3% of women have been victims of hate crime, 
26.3% of women have been victims of domestic abuse since the age of 16 
(compared with 13.6% of men) and 7.7% of women have been victims in the 
last year (compared with 4.4% of men) (ONS 2017). 
When looking at the proportions of oJences which the police \agged as 
domestic abuse (DA) related in 2016, it was seen that 11% of all oJences 
were DA related, and in particular 32% of violence against the person inci-
dents. Sexual violence shows a similar dominance of women as victims 
(2.7% women versus 0.7% men, CSEW 2015:Table 4.01). As such, when 
we look at the motivations behind certain oJences through the lens of sex-
based violence being a manifestation of hatred towards that sex, the picture 
looks much more compelling. Once again, it raises the worrying issue that 
only the most serious cases of harms against women are available within 
statistics; we cannot even begin to unpick the instances of hate speech that 
women may be suJering – the data simply are unavailable.
>e argument to see violence and harms against women, sexism and 
misogyny as forms of hate becomes even more persuasive when looking at 
crimes against particular groups of women. Perry, for instance, notes that 
violence against lesbians is a clear extension of male misogyny (2001:10). 
Another excellent example is that of sex workers. >e need for an organisa-
tion such as National Ugly Mugs, who:
take reports of incidents from sex workers and produce anonymised warnings 
which are sent directly to sex workers and front-line support projects throughout 
the UK […] share anonymous intelligence to the police […] support sex workers 
in making full reports to the police so that the perpetrators can be identi4ed, 
arrested and convicted […] ensure sex workers have access to professional 
services when they have been a victim of crime (UKNSWP 2016)
highlights the at-risk state of such groups of women (it is women who dom-
inate this 4eld of work). Serial killers such as Jack the Ripper, Peter SutcliJe 
 SEX DOESN’T MATTER? THE PROBLEMATIC STATUS OF SEX, MISOGYNY, AND HATE 73
and Steve Wright in England – and Gary Ridgway, Robert Hanson and Joel 
Rifkin in the USA – bring the fact that violence against sex workers is a sex 
issue to the fore. >ese individuals attacked female sex workers in the main 
– not male sex workers. Although this may be due to the greater numbers 
of women in sex work, and the greater visibility of those women, there is 
arguably something about the fact that it is their gender that makes such 
individuals more vulnerable. 
As already noted, some might argue that these men did not hate all 
women (see McPhail 2003): that may be so, but being a woman was the 
key de4ning feature which made the victims targets – albeit the hatred 
intersecting with another profession-based characteristic (sex work). Yet, 
at the same time, referring to notions of intersectionality7 often sidelines 
the underlying commonality of femaleness that surrounds victims of such 
hate crimes. Crimes against gay women, female Muslims, disabled women, 
trans women and women from other racial backgrounds (see Weston-
Scheuber 2012) all share the fact that they are women; however, the female-
ness goes under-examined compared with examining the ‘otherness’ of 
such victims relative to the general population (see also Weston-Scheuber 
2012). Perhaps such ‘otherness’ is the reasoning behind such visibility: in 
modern society we thrive and categorise ourselves based on diJerence – be 
that individuality or through processes of competition. To focus on simi-
larities running through victims (and oJenders) with regard to sex under-
mines this approach to social positionality, meaning addressing this issue is 
a mammoth task to undertake in social policy and criminal justice spheres. 
When considering the statistics noted, it is important to remember that 
this does not even take into consideration the large numbers of people 
who do not report such incidents, nor those who do not recognise such 
incidents as being worthy of criminal justice attention. >e de4nition by 
the College of Policing noted above does raise an interesting issue of the 
notion of ‘oJence’, i.e. ‘Telling a victim that a crime is not a hate crime could 
be deeply oJensive to them’ (College of Policing 2014:7). In reality, hate 
crime is focused upon prejudicial treatment of individuals based on some 
de4ning feature, and is particularly concerned with notions of the victim 
recognising such prejudicial behaviours as being oJensive. 
It is also important to situate the victim against the oJender, and against 
wider notions of patriarchy and structural inequality and misogyny. As 
Asquith notes with regard to ‘name calling’ within hate speech:
What brings us the greatest oJence or causes the greatest harm and distress 
will have as much to do with who we believe ourselves to be as it does with how 
others perceive us. In this sense, naming one’s subjectivity can be a positive act 
of nomination and an act of subordination, depending on who is naming, and 
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who has the power to name. Subordinating the other through naming creates a 
hierarchy of subject positions. (Asquith 2010:118)
When paired together with the fact that it is often men using hate speech 
against women – just as it is men who are generally in more dominant 
structural positions than women within culture and society – we can see 
an accumulation of harms against women which are greater together than 
their individual parts. Indeed, ‘sexualised hate speech can be seen as an 
expression of power or lack of power’ (Edström 2016:102). 
Sex and language
Asquith’s argument about notions of power and hierarchy noted already 
is useful. However, when this is applied to sexist speech, there is a clear 
disconnection between how we view women and how we view other pro-
tected and monitored characteristics. >ere has been a substantial cultural 
shift in the use of various derogatory terms regarding the 4ve monitored 
characteristics (and many more), even if this has been met with some cri-
tique by those arguing for the sanctity of freedom of speech (Hume 2015). 
Yet the same 4rm attention to ‘political correctness’8 does not seem to have 
fed through with regard to sexist speech, as President Trump’s words high-
lighted. >e phrase ‘like a girl’ is still used to imply weakness (in spite of 
Always Sanitary Towels attempting to rephrase this through their advertis-
ing campaign #likeagirl showing women’s strength [seemingly in spite of 
their menstruating tendencies]). Indeed, the habit of referring to women as 
‘girls’ shows the infantilising processes placed upon women. 
While research on violence against women far outweighs that in exis-
tence about hate speech, there is some evidence of its prevalence. For 
example, the National Union of Students (NUS) conducted a survey in 2010 
regarding women students’ experiences of harassment, stalking, violence 
and sexual assault and found that 65% of respondents had experienced:
• ‘Someone making sexual comments that made them feel 
uncomfortable; 
• Someone wolf whistling, catcalling or making sexual noises at 
them;
• Someone asking them questions about their sex or romantic life 
when it was clearly none of their business;
• Someone asking them questions about their sexuality when it was 
clearly none of their business’ (NUS 2010:12)
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and that ‘the most common behaviours reported were making sexual 
comments and sexual noises that made the respondent feel uncomfort-
able’ (NUS 2010:12). >is is within a university setting – one of the more 
liberal and inclusive of places (one might think/hope) that an individual 
experiences. Yet even in these places, sexed hate speech is rife, along with 
misogynistic ‘lad culture’ and physical harm (Universities UK 2016). 
Mason-Bish (2016) makes the point that, despite the ‘normality’ of such 
experiences, such encounters are harmful and upsetting, a point that was 
found in a piece of empirical research undertaken by Dr Maggie Wykes and 
Dr Jennifer Sloan at the University of Sheeld in 2013. When individuals 
living in South Yorkshire were asked about their experiences of sexism and 
sexual harassment, it was found that, in response to such experiences, 52% 
of the 374 respondents avoided being alone; another 52% avoided going out 
late at night; 28% changed their appearance; 17% carried an alarm or spray; 
16% changed a relationship; 12% avoided using public transport (similar 
4ndings were found problematising public transport in Coventry – see 
Osborne, 2013); 10% closed an online account; and 5% changed their work. 
It is clear that sexism and sexual harassment have a profound eJect upon 
individuals’ behaviours post-‘victimisation’; on top of this, there is an argu-
ment that the normalisation of sexual aggression, sexism and misogyny has 
the potential to lead to an accepting rape culture9 (Baker 2015; >omae and 
Pina 2015). Indeed, misogyny being at the root of violence against women 
was one of the rationales for the attempt by Nottinghamshire Police and 
Nottingham Women’s Centre to address the behaviour.  
Nottingham Police’s approach to record misogyny as hate crime shows 
one attempt to address this behaviour,10 while highlighting the problems 
of addressing misogyny more broadly: ‘Whilst misogynistic behaviour in 
itself may not be a criminal oJence, so doesn’t always lead to prosecution, 
reporting it means we can investigate and establish whether a crime has 
taken place’ (Nottinghamshire Police 2016:11). Developed in partnership 
with Nottingham Women’s Centre, the approach was received well by citi-
zens of Nottingham in terms of engagement: between 1 April 2016 and 12 
October 2016, 4fty-one misogynistic hate crime incidents and crimes were 
recorded, of which fourteen were recorded as crimes (Nottinghamshire 
Police 2016:7). Yet a problem is clear with this approach. While excellent 
in principle, it is being led by, and supported by, women. Indeed, at an 
event held in the Palace of Westminster on 25 October 2016 where the 
policy was showcased, of the thirty-three people in the room, only six were 
men. While the dominance of women should be 4ne in principle, without 
the buy-in of men, the future of such a policy initiative is fragile, as men 
are (in the main) the perpetrators of sexist and misogynistic violence and 
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crime. In addition, Kimmel (1994) argues that men act out their masculin-
ity (sometimes in the form of negative – i.e. violent or abusive – manifesta-
tions) for the bene4t of other men who grant them their masculinity. With 
this in mind, men are arguably more likely to change and police their own 
behaviour if held to account by other men.  
Discussion
So why is there so much aversion to including sex as a protected and moni-
tored characteristic in hate crime? A few ideas were mentioned earlier in 
this piece, but perhaps the most compelling is the notion put forward by 
McPhail (2003) and Jacoby (2002) in combination:
A related fear is that with violence against women being so prevalent, including 
gender as a status category would make the other status categories look less 
important and frequent in comparison. (McPhail 2003:269)
and
Equal protection under law is the ideal of every democratic society. A 
government that takes that ideal seriously tells potential criminals that they will 
be punished fully and fairly, regardless of the identity of their victims. Hate crime 
laws, by contrast, declare that some victims are more deserving than others. >is 
is a message no citizen should be willing to accept. (Jacoby 2002:122)
When seen together, these statements highlight a key issue with situat-
ing sex as a protected and monitored characteristic: the oJenders – men. 
Indeed, some would argue that such bias-crimes are actually a means of 
men acting out their gendered identities (Bufkin 1999; Messerschmidt 
1993; West and Zimmerman 1987) – often for the purposes of positioning 
themselves in the masculine hierarchy for male audiences (Kimmel 1994). 
As noted, although men can be victims of sexism and sexual harassment 
by women, this is less prevalent. If sexism, sexual harassment and violence 
against women were to be problematised to the same degree that other 
forms of hate crime are, this would raise a serious issue concerning male 
behaviours at every level of power. To address this would require an enor-
mous cultural shift, huge resource implications, and the problematisation 
of male behaviours of even the very men creating the legislation, social 
policy and policing. >e fact that this has not happened on any large scale 
just re-emphasises the point made earlier – without buy-in from the very 
men doing the harm, there is little hope for wide-scale change.  
Yet some men do buy in – Ewan McGregor is an excellent example – 
although perhaps his actions might have been better placed in confronting 
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the misogyny and sexism, rather than boycotting being near the perpetra-
tor. Men are working towards addressing misogyny and sexism – not least 
those police ocers who enforce Nottinghamshire’s policies. As such, it is 
clearly not that hard to achieve such change in reality, if there is acceptance 
of its importance from the top down.
In addition, there is a serious lack of knowledge regarding the motiva-
tions and implications of gender-based hate crimes. Indeed, McPhail and 
DiNitto found that prosecutors they spoke to were ‘insuciently informed 
about gender-bias hate crimes [… and] attribute violence against women 
to motivations of power and control rather than hate’ (2005:1162). >is 
shows serious issues of misunderstanding at the physical end of Kelly’s 
continuum of experiences; it is, therefore, unsurprising that those experi-
ences that are often seen to be ‘less serious’ (i.e. hate speech) go under-
acknowledged within criminal justice systems. It should also be recognised 
that this is the documented problem in Western democracies which sub-
scribe to (attempt) greater equality for women and have been subject to 
long-term pressure from (particularly feminist) organisations and public 
interest groups; in those societies where women are aJorded much less 
protection under the law, the case is even more problematic.
>is also raises another problem – the fact that the attention that is 
being given is often women-driven. >e seating of the issue within feminist 
discourse has the potential to create problems in itself: indeed, the fact that 
I am a woman arguing for greater recognition of the problem of sexism, 
misogyny and violence against women, and the fact that I have thrown in the 
privileged nature of having a penis, will probably mean that my arguments 
are immediately attributed to ‘feminist rantings’ and therefore seen as of 
lesser importance. Even at this level of discussion and debate, the feminist 
label appears to have been demonised and undermined with images of the 
1970s radical feminist movements, bra-burning and anti-male discourses. 
Even women are struggling to embrace the feminist label (in spite of inspir-
ing words from new-age feminists like Beyoncé and Caitlin Moran):
>e survey of members of Netmums, Britain’s largest women’s website, revealed 
almost a third (28 per cent) think traditional radical feminism is ‘too aggressive’ 
towards men while a quarter (24 per cent) no longer view it as a positive label for 
women. One in 4ve describe feminism as ‘old fashioned’ and simply ‘not relevant’ 
to their generation. And less than one in 10 (nine per cent) of those aged 25 to 
29 identi4ed with it, while a quarter of older women aged 45 to 50 described 
themselves as a feminist. […] And one in six women (17 per cent) even claim 
feminism has gone too far, oppressing men and losing sight of the natural roles of 
men and women. (#e Telegraph 2012)
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Elsewhere, I argue that feminists need to recognise men more in their dis-
cussions and policies, rather than sidelining them as oJenders who should 
merely be punished (Sloan, forthcoming). I would make a similar point here 
with regard to hate crime. While the inclusion of sex as a de4ning charac-
teristic within hate crime discourse will drastically alter the boundaries of 
the issue due to the massive problem that is misogyny, sexism and violence 
as experienced by women, in order to address hate crimes in general there 
needs to be some recognition of the fact that the oJending group tends to 
be the same throughout: men. Ault goes a step further to discuss the impli-
cations for other men too: ‘by ignoring violence against women as hate 
crime, and by failing to interpret anti-gay violence as gender-motivated, 
many hate crime policies promote the end of heterosexism without chal-
lenging male domination’ (1997:49). Including sex as a monitored char-
acteristic allows the role of masculinity and patriarchy to be seen much 
more clearly, and there are clearly advantages to the inclusion of gender 
within the law as an aggravating factor for prosecutors and the judiciary to 
take into consideration (so long as they are adequately informed regarding 
the lived experiences of such victims – McPhail and DiNitto 2005) (see 
Angelari 1994; Maher, McCulloch and Mason 2015).
By integrating the existing work being done to support victims of crime 
due to sex, it is arguable that a more joined-up and eJective approach to 
dealing with hate more broadly can be found and integrated into social, 
political and even personal policy, not least including it within hate crime 
statistics across all of the forces. Without this, the ad hoc nature of record-
ing risks losing out on best-practice models of working, as well as losing 
the symbolic force and importance of a national approach and buy-in from 
a higher level of power. Working together to combat hate clearly makes 
more sense. It would help to show that sex does matter.
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Notes
1 >e rise in hate crime post-Brexit became visible in particular due to the irregu-
larity of such enormous socio-political events at the time. When considering hate 
crime against women, the opposite often happens – it becomes invisible due to its 
regularity (see also Weston-Scheuber 2012).
2 In 2007, Sophie Lancaster was attacked and beaten to death in Lancashire due to 
prejudice directed against ‘goths’ held by a group of teenagers. ‘Goths’ refers to a 
subculture that is commonly identi4able by virtue of wearing dark clothing and 
make-up, and with an interest in ‘goth’ music (although the actual de4nition is sub-
ject to some debate – BBC 2013).
3 >e Crime Survey of England and Wales, an annual victimisation survey, reported 
that ‘26% of women […] had experienced domestic abuse since the age of 16, 
equivalent to an estimated 4.3 million female victims’ (Oce for National Statistics 
2017:3), with women ‘around twice as likely to have experienced domestic abuse 
since the age of 16 (26.3%) than men (13.6%)’ (2017:7), and with women ‘over 5 
times as likely as men to have experienced [sexual assault (including attempts)] 
since the age of 16’ (2017:7).
4 >e legal jurisdictions of the United Kingdom are numerous, so in this paper I 
simply focus on England and Wales, which share a legal and criminal justice system.
5 Along with age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; 
pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; and sexual orientation (Equality 
Act 2010 s4).
6 >ere is little argument that globally women are often highly disadvantaged and 
suJer inequalities to a great extent.
7 Intersectionality has been de4ned as: ‘the relationships among multiple dimensions 
and modalities of social relations and subject formations’ (McCall 2005:1771).
8 Indeed, there is some feminist debate about the usefulness of the term ‘political 
correctness’: ‘>e term which has been generally adopted by the popular press in 
discussions about sexism has been “political correctness” which suggests an over-
punctilious concern with the “trivial” issue of language, rather than serious ques-
tions of equal opportunities and discrimination against women’ (Mills 2008:5).
9 Writing for #e Guardian, Laura Bates de4nes ‘rape culture’ as follows: ‘It describes 
a culture in which rape and sexual assault are common (in the UK over 85,000 
women are raped and 400,000 sexually assaulted every single year). It describes a 
culture in which dominant social norms belittle, dismiss, joke about or even seem 
to condone rape and sexual assault. It describes a culture in which the normalisa-
tion of rape and sexual assault are so great that often victims are blamed, either 
implicitly or explicitly, when these crimes are committed against them. A culture 
in which other factors such as media objecti4cation make it easier to see women as 
dehumanised objects for male sexual purposes alone’ (Bates 2014).
10 Other police forces are following the approach, albeit in an ad hoc, rather than 
force-wide, manner.
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